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Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal – Multi-Agent relationships: 
Experimental Evidence 
 
Free-Riding et bienveillance dans la relation principal – multi-
agents :  Evidence expérimentale 
 
CLAUDE MEIDINGER*, JEAN-LOUIS RULLIERE** AND MARIE-CLAIRE 
VILLEVAL** 
 
Abstract : How do intrinsic motivations such as fairness and reciprocity influence the 
efficiency of a principal – multi-agent relationship when joint production in a team is 
considered? Focusing on moral hazard in teams (Holmström, 1982), this paper reports 
the results of an experiment designed to determine whether principal’s fairness helps in 
reducing free-riding amongst team members. Two treatments were run, with 
reshuffling (stranger treatment) and without reshuffling (partner treatment). 
Experimental evidence shows that i) offers of fair contracts favor team cooperation in the 
stranger treatment, whereas ii) repeated interactions do not necessarily improve team 
cooperation. All the results of the partner treatment point to the difficulty of establishing 
a fruitful cooperation between principals and team members unequally motivated by 
genuine fairness considerations.  
  
Keywords: Fairness, Experimental Economics, Principal-Agent Relationship, Team 
Production. 
JEL Classification: J33, C91, C92, D63 
 
Résumé: Comment les motivations intrinsèques telles que la bienveillance et la 
réciprocité influencent-elles l'efficience de la relation principal - multi-agents dans le travail en 
équipe? Cet article rapporte les résultats d'une expérience conçue pour déterminer si la 
bienveillance du principal vis-à-vis des agents permet de limiter le free-riding parmi les 
membres d’une équipe. Deux traitements ont été réalisés, l’un avec recomposition des 
appariements à chaque répétition (traitement de type « stranger ») et l’autre avec groupes fixes 
(traitement de type « partner »). Les résultats expérimentaux montrent que i) les offres de 
contrats équitables favorisent la coopération au sein de l’équipe dans le traitement 
« stranger », tandis que ii) les interactions répétées n'améliorent pas nécessairement la 
coopération en équipe. Tous les résultats du traitement « partner » montrent la difficulté à 
établir une coopération fructueuse entre le principal et les membres d’une équipe motivés à 
des degrés différents par des considérations de bienveillance. 
Mots clés: équité, économie expérimentale, relation principal-agent, production en 
équipe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
What is the impact of intrinsic motivations such as fairness and 
reciprocity on the efficiency of the principal – multi-agent relationship ? The 
importance of vertical fairness in the interactions between a principal and an 
agent has been documented by many experimental studies; the principal pays 
higher wages than those required by the incentive constraint and the agent 
delivers a level of effort greater than the one theoretically predicted (Anderhub, 
Gächter, and Königstein, 1999; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1998; Güth, Klose, Königstein and Schwalbach, 1998; 
Keser and Willinger, 2000). 
These experimental results have been obtained in designing principal – 
agent games as a one-to-one relationship in which one principal faces one agent. 
However, in real life, most people are working within teams. Do these results 
hold when considering a principal – multi-agent relationship? As pointed out by 
Holmström in his seminal paper on moral hazard in teams (1982), a multi-agent 
setting is characterized both by an incentive for agents to free-ride in the 
context of joint production and by competition in controlling incentives, as 
agents play a non-cooperative game. An optimal allocation cannot be achieved as 
a Nash equilibrium with a binding budget balancing constraint (where the 
outcome is fully allocated to team members). A budget breaking rule, realized by 
introducing a principal as a residual claimant, can be efficiency-enhancing. The 
rule stipulates that the joint outcome will accrue to the principal in the event 
that the actual outcome has not reached the expected target level. Introducing a 
budget breaker would be more efficient than an active monitoring. 
However, this punishment mechanism faces serious drawbacks. A 
problem of moral hazard on the part of the principal can be pointed out 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984). With such a contractual arrangement, the third 
party has an incentive to bribe one team member to shirk and this clandestine 
deal results in a sub-optimal outcome. Rasmusen (1987) also shows that an all 
agent contract can still be efficient if workers are risk averse. Free-riding in a 
team can be eliminated by introducing a lottery in a “massacre contract” in 
which one randomly selected agent is rewarded and all the other agents are 
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punished when an out-of-equilibrium outcome is achieved by the team. In 
contrast, Andolfatto and Nosal (1997) extend Holmström’s perspective in 
designing a contract in which delivering a payment to the principal even though 
the desired outcome has been achieved helps reducing the agents’ incentive to 
free-ride. 
As far as principal-multi-agent relationships are considered, this paper 
intends to pursue this analysis by asking whether fairness and reciprocity help 
in reducing free-riding within a team. Our aim is not to design the more efficient 
payment scheme but to identify the influence of intrinsic motivations on the 
result of a principal – multi-agent relationship, beyond the respect of 
participation and incentive compatibility constraints. How do the proportion of 
the total revenue kept by the principal for himself (index of vertical fairness) 
and the threat of punishment (index of negative reciprocity) affect effort 
decisions within a team? Does vertical fairness favor solidarity amongst team 
members? 
It should be noted that recent supporting evidence for horizontal fairness 
between agents has also been reported from experiments which consider either 
an all agent framework (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Königstein and Tietz, 
1998; Carpenter, 1999) or a principal – multi-agent framework (Rossi and 
Warglien, 1999; Güth, Königstein, Kovacs, and Zala-Mezo, 1999). In Güth and alii 
however, the authors do not really design a team but rather a collection of 
separate contracts between a unique principal and many agents. Experimental 
evidence of horizontal fairness is here delivered very indirectly, through the 
existence of less asymmetric contracts offered by the principal and through a 
lower dispersion of efforts when contracts are observable by all agents. Rossi 
and Warglien’s approach is closer to ours inasmuch as it investigates how 
principal’s fairness influences cooperation between two interdependent agents 
performing a production game. Our approach is however different. We consider 
heterogeneous agents and a threat of punishment by the principal. 
Distinctively, this paper reports an experiment designed as a principal – 
multi-agent game in which a principal faces a team composed of two players 
with different productivity levels. 
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The principal first offers a contract that, in exchange of a non-binding 
desired outcome, specifies a team payment scheme (TPS-1) under which each 
agent receives an equal share. In such a scheme, because unequal production 
skills (i.e. unequal productivity) amongst agents depend on natural endowments 
such as talents, the principal asks each agent to provide a same effort. Despite 
their differences in talents, she pays them according to a scheme based on a 
collective ownership in talents (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1999). Agents with 
different productivity levels but developing the same effort suggested by the 
principal will receive the same payoff. 
The offer can be more or less generous, depending on both the share that 
the principal keeps for herself (either 25% or 50% of the outcome) and on the 
effort level suggested to achieve the desired outcome.  
If the actual outcome is less than the desired one, the principal can 
decide whether she applies the previous TPS-1 or a second team payment 
scheme (TPS-2) under which wages are individualized according to productivity 
levels. In that case, each player bears a share of the TPS-2 implementation cost. 
This approach based on a private ownership of talents is substituted to the other 
one based on a collective ownership of talents. 
With players only motivated by pecuniary incentives, it is obvious that 
the threat to apply TPS-2 is not credible. And because both agents develop a 
dominant free riding strategy under TPS-1, the outcome will be a non 
cooperative one. Things can nevertheless be different if players take into 
account fair behavior. 
In real life as in many experiments, the willingness to be kind to others 
seems highly contingent on the behavior of others. People help those who are 
helping them and hurt those who are hurting them (Rabin, 1993). Clearly, such a 
behavior can entail some economic consequences both on vertical relationships 
(between the principal and the team) and on horizontal relationships (between 
team members). A generous contract offered by the principal in a framework of 
skill solidarity may, by reciprocity, induce cooperation within a team, as well as 
free riding in such a situation can trigger punishment. Intrinsic motivations 
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within team (solidarity, peer pressure or mutual monitoring) may have 
something to do with the success of cooperation (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). 
This paper reports the results of two repeated game experiments with 
and without reshuffling that allow to study the impact of reciprocity and 
reputation in principal-multi-agent sequential move games. Two series of 
experiments were run, a stranger treatment (with reshuffling) and a partner 
treatment (without reshuffling). The stranger treatment serves as a benchmark 
for measuring the extent of genuinely reciprocal fairness (leading to non-
strategic conditional behavior to reward kind acts and to punish unkind ones 
even if costly). The partner treatment leaves room for reputation building. 
Experimental evidence shows that, in the stranger treatment, offers of 
fair contracts, some of them being equity-based, induce team cooperation, 
whereas offers of unfair contracts always induce team defection. This result is 
similar to those reported by Rossi and Warglien (1999). Despite the prediction 
that we should observe neither principal’s fairness nor team cooperation if 
subjects are only motivated by pecuniary considerations, team cooperation 
occurs in half of fair contracts. Therefore, vertical behavior influences horizontal 
behavior within a team. However, in opposition to many other experimental 
results, repeated interactions do not necessarily improve team cooperation. All 
the results of the partner treatment point to the difficulty to establish a fruitful 
cooperation between principals and team members unequally motivated by 
fairness considerations. In the partner treatment, vertical behavior also 
influences horizontal behavior, through notably the agents’ interpretation of 
intentions. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops 
the model and presents the general frame of the game, the four stages of the 
game, the standard strategic analysis of the game and its strategic analysis 
when reciprocal fairness is taken into account. Section 3 gives a brief 
presentation of the experimental design. Section 4 analyses the experimental 
results. A brief conclusion is given. 
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2. THE PRINCIPAL – MULTI-AGENT GAME 
The game involves three players, a principal (player X ) and a team 
composed with two agents (players Y1  and Y2 ). These matched players have to 
share an outcome whose amount depends on their decisions. 
2.1. The general frame of the game 
Let us first define ri  and ei  as player Yi ’s productivity and effort levels, 
respectively, with { }i Î 12, . The resulting outcome is then py p e e= +( )r r1 1 2 2 , 
with p = 12 , the price of the output, and r1 1= , r2 2= . That outcome has to be 
divided according to a sharing scheme decided by the principal and which 
depends on both a parameter q  (that determines the principal’s share) and a 
team payment scheme (that determines the allocation of ( )1-q py  between the 
agents). 
Two team payment schemes are available in the game. 
q The first one, TPS-1, consists of a team payment scheme according to which 
each agent receives an equal share of the outcome whatever his productivity 
level. This solidarity scheme is based on the idea of a collective ownership in 
talents. The players’ shares are qpy  for the principal and 2/)1( pyq-  for 
each agent.  
q The second one, TPS-2, is a productivity-based team payment scheme. This 
second scheme is based on the idea of a private ownership in talents. In that 
case, the implementation of individualization entails a cost C0  (with C0  =48) 
that is subtracted from py  before the sharing. The players’ shares are 
q( py C- 0 ) for the principal and 
ji
iCpy
rr
r
q
+
-- ))(1( 0  for agent i . 
In both TPS-1 and TPS-2, the principal’s payoff is equal to her outcome 
share and the agents’ payoffs are determined by subtracting from their outcome 
shares a personal cost of effort C e
e
ai
i( ) =
2
 with a = 4 . When running the 
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experiments, we added 100 to these theoretical payoffs in order to avoid 
negative earnings. 
The game therefore consists of the following elements. 
The principal designs a labor contract and makes a “take it or leave it “ 
offer to the agents. The contract specifies a desired outcome that can be realized 
through a common non-binding level of effort e E* Î = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 
20, 22, 24} provided by each agent. It also specifies a value for q , either equal to 
0.5 or 0.25 which, once chosen, will be retained for both TPS. When the actual 
outcome, resulting from the agents’ efforts, equals at least the desired outcome, 
TPS-1 is applied. When that expected outcome has not been achieved, the 
principal can freely decide to apply either TPS-1 or TPS-2.  
In spite of the fact that e*  is not binding, that level of effort is 
nevertheless indicated by the principal to her agents, as a kind of cheap talk. 
2.2. The four stages of the game 
q In the first stage, the principal indicates to the agents a common non-
binding level of effort e E* Î  that determines a desired outcome 
amounting to )(** 21 rr += pepy  and chooses a q  either equal to 0.25 or 
0.5. 
q In the second stage, informed about the principal’s offer, each agent 
independently accepts or declines the offer. If at least one agent refuses 
the contract, the round is over and the players’ payoffs are null. If both 
agents accept, the third stage starts up. 
q In the third stage, each agent Y  freely and independently chooses in E  a 
level of effort. This determines an outcome py p e e= +( )r r1 1 2 2  to be 
shared. 
q In the fourth stage, the principal is informed about the actual outcome 
py . If py py³ * , she applies TPS-1. Otherwise, she can choose between 
enforcing TPS-1 or applying TPS-2, keeping the same value of q  in both 
cases. 
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The four stages of the game are common knowledge for all players at the 
start of the game. Tables 1 to 12 in Appendix show the payoffs’ matrices for the 
two agents and the principal under TPS-1 and TPS-2. 
2.3. The standard strategic analysis of the game 
Because we avoid negative earnings, the participation constraint of a non-
negative payoff for the agents is clearly satisfied. And if the two agents 
cooperate and follow the principal’s suggestion, a maximum common level of 
e* = 24  has to be required to maximize the principal's payoff. Under TPS-1, with 
25.0=q , that level of effort will also maximize the agents’ cooperation payoffs 
picoop , but not with q = 05. . In that sense, if the principal wants the agents to 
cooperate, she has to take into account an incentive compatibility constraint 
given by: 
e Arg coop
e
i* ( ) maxq p=                                                  (1) 
We therefore have e * ( . )025 24=  and e * ( . )05 18= . 
But clearly, that will not be enough to ensure the agents’ cooperation. The 
principal must also take into account the possibility of using TPS-2 as a credible 
threat. 
From the agents’ point of view, regardless of the TPS adopted, both of 
them have a dominant free riding strategy. These strategies are under TPS-1: 
 
e a pifr
i= -( )1
4
q
r
                                                           (2) 
and under TPS-2: 
e a
p
ifr
i
i j
= -
+
( )1
2
2
q
r
r r
                                                  (3) 
In Tables 1 to 12 in Appendix, these strategies lead to the following effort 
values: 
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q With q = 0 25. , under TPS-1: e fr1 =8 or 10 and e fr2 18=  
q With q = 0 25. , under TPS-2: e fr1 =6 and 242 =fre  
q With q = 05. , under TPS-1: e fr1 =6 and e fr2 12=  
q With q = 05. , under TPS-2, e fr1 4=  and e fr2 16= . 
In one-shot games or in repeated games with reshuffling, with players 
only motivated by pecuniary incentives, the threat to apply TPS-2 is not 
credible. It follows that both agents have an incentive to free ride whatever the 
value of q  and will play their dominant free riding strategy under TPS-1. The 
predicted outcome will then be a free riding solution. With 25.0=q , payoffs will 
be 282 for Y1 and 217 or 226 for Y2. With q = 05. , payoffs will be 181 for Y1 and 
154 for Y2. The principal’s payoff pp  will be equal to 232 or 238 with q = 0 25.  and 
equal to 280 with q = 05. . Therefore, by backward induction, the principal’s best 
choice is to select q = 05.  in the first stage of the game and not to apply TPS-2 after 
a deviation in the fourth stage. 
In repeated games without reshuffling, is there any interest for the 
principal to build a reputation of toughness ? 
For q = 0 25. , both agents get a payoff of 280 if they cooperate by achieving 
the effort level of e* = 24  suggested by the principal. When TPS-2 is considered 
as a credible threat, an agent that defects has to play his free riding strategy 
under TPS-2. With such a strategy, Y1 cannot hope to get more than a payoff of 
241 when free-riding under TPS-2 and therefore has an interest to cooperate if 
he expects Y2 will cooperate. But confronted with a cooperative Y1, Y2 has an 
interest to trigger TPS-2. By playing  e2=22, he will get a payoff of 363. Knowing 
that, Y1 will not cooperate and the outcome will then be the free riding solution 
under TPS-2 with a principal’s payoff of 250. 
For q = 05. , and therefore e* = 18 , both agents get a payoff of 181 if they 
achieve the required effort level. But here too, it is clear that agent Y2  has an 
incentive to trigger TPS-2 if he conjectures that Y1 cooperates. By playing his 
free riding strategy 162 =e under TPS-2, he will get a payoff of 220 instead of 
 - 10 - 
 
181. Knowing that, agent Y1  will not cooperate and the outcome will be the free 
riding solution under TPS-2, 41 =fre and 162 =fre , with payoffs of 160 for Y1 , 164 
for Y2 and 292 for the principal. 
 Therefore, in a repeated game without reshuffling, the principal’s best 
choice is to select q = 05.  in the first stage of the game and to apply TPS-2 after a 
deviation in the fourth stage. 
 
2.4. The introduction of fairness considerations 
It is clear that some contracts can be considered as being fair. With 
25.0=q  and e* = 24  for example, the principal is going to accept a reduced 
payoff of 316, instead of a payoff of 424 she can expect by asking for e* = 18  with 
q = 05. . She also offers the agents the opportunity to get an increased payoff of 
280 if they cooperate, to be compared to the payoff of 181 they could get with 
q = 05.  and e* = 18 . It is also clear that among fair contracts ( 25.0=q ), some of 
them can also be considered as being equity-based. With a suggested level of 
effort 18£e , each employee’s payoff is equal to or greater than the principal’s 
payoff. Such a vertical fairness may induce agents to cooperate. It may also 
motivate the principal to apply the TPS-2 threat (negative reciprocity) in order 
to punish the agents for not responding positively to her kindness even in a one-
shot game. 
One should also note that with q = 05. , because the principal’s payoff is 
always greater than the agent’s payoffs for any suggested level of effort, there 
can be no equity-based contracts. But there can be unfair contracts with a level 
of suggested effort above the one determined by the incentive compatibility 
constraint. For 18>e , the principal tries to reinforce her first mover advantage 
by using cheap talk to suggest a high level of effort. 
From that point of view, it seems that vertical fairness may lead to a more 
fruitful interpretation of observed behavior. 
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In one-shot games or repeated games with reshuffling, because reputation 
is ruled out by design, any contract with q = 0 25.  may be interpreted as a 
contract offered by a principal motivated by fairness considerations. A look at 
the principal’s strategy may also allow to distinguish principals playing fair only 
for strategic reasons from principals genuinely motivated by fairness. Only the 
latter will punish agents for not responding kindly to a fair offer. 
In repeated games without reshuffling, where there is scope for 
reputation building, two different types of principals must be distinguished. 
q On the one hand, greedy principals trying to maximize their payoffs 
with q = 05.  through a toughness reputation that destroys team 
cooperation. With TPS-2 credible, Y2 will defect, the punishment will 
be applied and 292=pp  (better than 280 obtained without 
punishment for 5.0=q ). 
q On the other hand, genuinely kind principals trying to enforce 
cooperation through fair offers with a maximum payoff of 316=pp . It 
should be noted that vertical fairness will usually not work without 
something that could be related to fair behavior among team members. 
Without punishment, Y1 has a strong incentive to free ride (under 
TPS-1, he is offered half of the team’s payoff despite his lower 
productivity and he will get a free riding payoff greater than Y2 ’s 
payoff). With punishment, Y2 has the same incentive. It is also worth 
noting here that greedy principals have interest to mimic genuinely 
kind principals if they consider that fairness can be an efficient means 
to increase their payoff. 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
The experiments were performed in November 1999 at the University of 
Lyon. They were run in a computerized way with Regate as experimental 
software. Subjects were drawn from the undergraduate population at the 
Management School of Lyon and no subject was experienced. Before the 
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experiment started, written instructions were distributed to the participants 
and read aloud. A pre-experimental questionnaire was distributed in order to 
check whether the rules of the game were fully understood. The payoffs 
functions and the productivity distribution are common knowledge. Tables were 
distributed to participants indicating the principal’s and each employee’s 
payoffs according to the individual effort levels, for each sharing rule (TPS-1 and 
TPS-2) and each value of the q  parameter (see Appendix). 
12 subjects participated in a session (4 groups of 3 subjects for each 
period). 4 sessions were organized (3 sessions with 4 groups and 1 session with 3 
groups). It gives 15 groups of observations. Each subject was randomly assigned 
either the role of a principal (player X ), or the role of an employee with a low 
(player Y1 ) or a high productivity (player Y2 ). In each period, each principal is 
matched with two heterogeneous employees.  
Two treatments were run.  
q A first series of sessions consisted of a “stranger treatment” (7 
groups). Each subject played 15 rounds of the game in the same role 
but he could be matched with different players all along the session. 
The matching of a principal with two agents was determined 
randomly each period. This treatment excludes repeated game effects. 
q A second series of sessions consisted of a “partner treatment” (8 
groups) without reshuffling. In this case, each subject played 15 
rounds of the game, staying in the same role and matched with the 
same two other players all along the session. This treatment enables 
to observe reputation effects and the principal’s will to build a 
toughness reputation. 
Each session started with 5 trial periods (which the results were not 
taken into account for analyses and payments) in order to help players to get 
accustomed with the rules of the game.  
In each period, employees are informed of the level of effort suggested by 
the principal, *e , of the outcome share q  the principal intends to keep for 
herself, of the amount of the actual outcome, py, and of the team payment 
 - 13 - 
 
scheme which will be actually implemented (TPS-1 or TPS-2). In each period, the 
principal is informed of the acceptance or rejection of the contract, and of the 
size of the actual outcome. Each player in each period is also informed of the 
payoffs received by the two other players with which he is playing. This ended 
the period. During the experiment, each player could see on the upper half of 
his or her computer screen a table showing his or her decisions and results in all 
previous rounds of the game. 
At the end of the session, each player was paid his or her average net 
payoff in the 15 rounds in French Francs according to the conversion rate 1 
ECU= 0,4 FF. A showing up fee of 20 FF was added. 
IV – EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
The total number of contracts offered by the principals is 105 in the 
stranger treatment (ST) and 120 in the partner treatment (PT). Let us consider 
successively these two treatments.  
4.1. The stranger treatment 
Contracts: 26 contracts (25%) are fair (q=0.25) and, among them, 18 
contracts are equity-based. Out of the 79 remaining contracts with q=0.5, 33 
contracts (42%) are unfair. A one-tailed binomial test leads, under the normal 
distribution approximation, to the rejection of the hypothesis H0 (no difference 
between the probabilities of choosing 5.0=q  or 25.0=q ) at a significance level 
of 0.005, and to the acceptance of a greater probability to choose 5.0=q . 
Due to the binding participation constraint, all contracts offered should 
be accepted since they offer payoffs strictly greater than zero. All contracts 
offered with q=0.25 are accepted and 4 contracts with q=0.5 are rejected. This 
yields a total of 101 contracts accepted. 
The distribution of the effort values e according to the different values of 
q  is given in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of offers according to the value of theta and the 
suggested effort level (e) in the stranger treatment 
With q =0.25, e should be equal to 24 but in fact, only 19% of the contracts 
respect this incentive compatibility constraint. 81% of the contracts suggest a 
lower level of effort. 
With q=0.5, 14% of the contracts respect the incentive compatibility 
constraint (e=18). 42% of offers suggest a level of effort higher than the incentive 
compatibility constraint (unfair offers). 
Team cooperation: defined as the respect by both agents of the 
suggested effort level, it should be noted that team cooperation is weak (21% of 
accepted contracts) (see Table 1). 
 
Suggested effort (e) # cases 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
 
Total 
=q 0.25 
Accepted contracts 
Team cooperation 
   
2 
1 
 
6 
6 
 
1 
1 
 
4 
2 
 
2 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
2 
0 
 
3 
1 
  
5 
1 
 
26 
13 
=q 0.5 
Accepted contracts 
Team cooperation 
 
2 
2 
  
2 
1 
 
5 
2 
 
8 
1 
 
4 
0 
 
5 
0 
 
7 
1 
 
11 
1 
 
9 
0 
 
7 
0 
 
15 
0 
 
75 
8 
 
Table 1. Team cooperation in the stranger treatment 
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Team cooperation is observed in 50% of accepted contracts with q =0.25 
but only in 11% of contracts with q =0.5. Unfair contracts (q =0.5 and e>18) 
never induce team cooperation. By contrast, equity-based contracts (q =0.25 and 
e £ 18) usually support team cooperation. Therefore, with a broader fairness 
concept including equity considerations, it seems here that principal’s fairness 
helps in reducing free-riding within the team (positive reciprocity). 
If one looks now at the individual agent behavior, one should note that 
the rates of defection increase with the value of e and are generally greater for 
q=0.5 than for q=0.25. When q=0.25, the less (more) productive agent defects in 
38.5% (42.3%) of the contracts. When q=0.5, the less (more) productive agent 
defects in 73.3% (70.7%) of the contracts. For both values of q , a 2c test (at a 
level of significance of 0.60) leads to the acceptation of equal frequencies of 
defection for agents Y1 and Y2 ( 2c = 0.3252 for q=0.25 and 0.2198 for q=0.5). 
Punishment: in the stranger treatment, a principal motivated only by 
pecuniary considerations should never apply punishment (TPS-2). The 
experimental evidence shows that punishment has been applied in 13 cases out 
of 80 group defections (16.2%) and just once with q=0.25 (negative reciprocity). 
One should point out that punishment, applied in 6 of the unfair contracts, 
reinforces in those cases the principal’s meanness. The evidence therefore 
mostly points to principals either playing fair for strategic reasons or trying to 
maximize their payoffs through a first mover advantage with q=0.5. 
Payoffs: As displayed by Table 2, fair contracts produce more efficient 
results. The average size of the pie is greater for q=0.25 than for q=0.5. Equity-
based contracts are not however more efficient than this average. By contrast, 
by suggesting high efforts, unfair contracts somehow succeed in achieving an 
amount to be shared greater than the average one obtained when q=0.5. 
 
Nature of 
contracts 
Average size 
of the pie 
Principal’s 
payoff 
Less 
productive 
agent’s payoff 
More 
productive 
agent’s payoff 
All contracts 708.2 265.0 173.0 170.2 
Contracts     
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withq=0.25   824.3 230.6 242.9 228.6 
Equity-based 
contracts 
 
812.0 
 
228.0 
 
240.9 
 
226.1 
Contracts 
withq=0.5 
 
670.0 
 
276.3 
 
149.9 
 
151.1 
Unfair 
contracts 
 
713.1 
 
296.1 
 
159.9 
 
150.2 
 
Table 2. Average payoffs in the stranger treatment 
Fair contracts (including equity-based ones) produce a quasi-equal pie 
sharing among the three players, with a small advantage to the less productive 
agent. As a matter of fact, the principal gets her worse payoff when she offers 
equity-based contracts and her best payoff when she offers unfair contracts. But 
for both agents, the payoff gap between these two kinds of contracts is larger by 
far. 
 
 
4.2. The partner treatment 
Contracts: 8 groups have played the partner treatment, giving 8 series 
of independent observations (120 contracts offered).  
39 contracts (33%) are fair (q=0.25) and among them, 22 contracts are 
equity-based (e £ 18).Only 38% of the 39 contracts respect the incentive 
compatibility constraint. 
In the 81 remaining contracts with 5.0=q , only 5% respect the incentive 
compatibility constraint. 31 contracts (38%) are unfair )18( >e . 
In spite of the fact that the proportion of contracts offered with q=0.25 is 
greater in the partner treatment (33%) than in the stranger treatment (25%), it 
should be noted here that a 2c  (corrected for continuity) leads to the 
acceptation of equal frequencies of both types of contracts in both populations 
( 58,12 =c  with a probability of 0.20). This may point to the fact that greedy 
principals do not really see any interest to mimic fair principals in order to 
build a reputation of fairness. A similar comparison made respectively for the 
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first round of the repeated game (t=1) and the last round (t=15) shows no 
significant difference (at a level of 0.70) between the two populations.  
However, it seems that most contracts with q=0.25 cannot be interpreted 
as a sign of principal’s fairness. Unlike the stranger treatment, in the partner 
treatment one should look at the evolution of proposed contracts over time to 
appreciate fairness intentions.  
A look at Figures 2 and 3 below shows that only three principals out of 
eight start the repeated game by offering fair contracts and that most of the fair 
contracts are proposed at rounds 10 and 11 (Figure 2), just after a sharp decline 
of the average size of the pie at round 9 (Figure 3). 
Evolution of contracts offered - PT
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Figure 2. Evolution of the value of theta over time in the partner treatment 
Evolution of the average size of the pie - PT
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Figure 3. Evolution of the average size of the pie in the partner treatment 
These observations therefore seem to point to the fact that most 
principals do not care about fairness. They try to enforce cooperation with 
q =0.5 and worry about the shrinking size of the pie, just around the middle of 
the game, due to the offer of unfair contracts (from rounds 6 to 9, unfair 
contracts represent 46% of contracts with q =0.5, and more than one third of the 
total contracts offered). But even though fair contracts offered at round 10 help 
to increase the average size of the pie, they are nevertheless proposed too late 
to be considered as a sign of trustful cooperation. Consequently, at the end of 
the game (rounds 12 to 15), the proportion of fair contracts collapses and the 
value of e increases, a classical effect of end game. 
Finally, a total of 108 contracts have then been accepted. But just note 
that if, in the partner treatment as in the stranger treatment, all contracts 
offered with q=0.25 are accepted, a smaller proportion of contracts offered with 
q=0.5 are here accepted (81.5% versus 95% in the stranger treatment). This has 
something to do with the strategies of some agents that use contract rejection 
not only as a punishment device but also as an incentive one. 
Team cooperation: Team cooperation is globally less developed in the 
partner treatment (16% of accepted contracts) than in the stranger treatment 
 - 19 - 
 
(see Table 3). A 2c test rejects the null hypothesis at a level of a=0.01 for q=0.25 
and at a level of  a=0.15 for q=0.5. Only associated with low levels of suggested 
effort (e<10 with q=0.25 and e<12 with q=0.5), team cooperation is indeed never 
achieved with unfair contracts. 
 
Suggested effort (e) # cases 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
 
Total 
q=0.25 
Accepted contracts 
Team cooperation 
 
2 
2 
  
1 
1 
  
2 
0 
 
12 
0 
 
3 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
2 
0 
  
15 
0 
 
39 
3 
q=0.5 
Accepted contracts 
Team cooperation 
 
5 
5 
 
5 
4 
 
4 
3 
 
4 
1 
 
5 
1 
 
6 
0 
 
9 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
3 
0 
 
5 
0 
 
7 
0 
 
15 
0 
 
69 
14 
 
Table 3. The extent of team cooperation in the partner treatment 
 
Such a lack of team cooperation is explained by most of the principals’ 
behavior, trying to enforce cooperation with q=0.5 at the beginning of the game. 
Generally not considered as a sign of trustful cooperation, only 3 out of the 39 
proposed fair contracts lead to team cooperation. 
 
Coordination failures and payoffs: Table 4 displays the distribution 
of groups’ payoffs. A look at subjects’ behavior in some groups illustrates the 
difficulties to achieve coordination. Two particular groups are here chosen : 
Group 1 which exhibits a failure of coordination with a genuinely kind principal 
and Group 3 that exhibit the same failure with a greedy principal. 
 
Group 
Average 
suggested 
effort 
Frequency of 
theta=0.25 
Frequency of 
punishment 
Average 
Y1’s 
effort 
Average 
Y2’s 
effort 
Average 
pie 
Average 
principal’s 
payoff 
Average 
Y1’s 
payoff 
Average 
Y2’s 
payoff 
All con- 
tracts 
15.2 39 22 7.7 12.3 650 226 172 156 
1 18.8 8 2 12.4 10 585 159 121 152 
2 14.7 1 3 8 9 591 224 144 153 
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3 18 1 5 8.9 14 743 305 177 167 
4 21.7 4 3 5.8 17.2 686 230 175 141 
5 7.2 3 2 7.9 12.5 695 274 221 165 
6 12.3 14 2 4.5 14.8 710 205 239 184 
7 12 2 1 5.8 7.5 500 162 128 121 
8 17.3 6 4 9.3 12.7 689 245 174 167 
 
Table 4. Distribution of payoffs in groups 
 
q Let us first consider Group 1, the worst but one in terms of average 
pie. Figure 4 displays subjects’ behavior. 
Over the five first rounds, two out of the three subjects (the principal and 
agent Y1) try to set up a coordination on q=0.25 and e=24. But agent Y2 defects 
by playing a low level of effort. Such a behavior triggers a retaliation war. It is 
interesting here to note that such a war takes place precisely between those two 
subjects that first agree on coordination. At round 5, partly for inciting the other 
agent to raise his contribution, Y1 defects (horizontal punishment). The 
principal retaliates by proposing an unfair contract in the next two rounds 
(vertical punishment) and this leads Y1 to reject both offers. Afterwards, fair 
offers cannot prevent Y1 to defect, then to reject the proposed contracts with 
q=0.5 at rounds 13 and 14. Finally, the principal enforces punishment in the last 
round.  
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Figure 4. Evolution of subjects’ behavior in Group 1 
q By contrast, let us consider Group 3, which achieved the best average 
pie (Figure 5). 
Efficiency can be here explained by a generalized lack of reciprocity 
concern. First of all, except at round 10, it should be noted that the greedy 
principal ever uses her first mover advantage by choosing q =0.5 and suggesting 
on the average a high level of effort (9 unfair contracts over 15 rounds). 
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Figure 5. Evolution of subjects’ behavior in Group 3 
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In addition, she mostly enforces punishment (at rounds 3, 4, 6, 11 and 15) 
with unfair contracts (4 out of 5 cases of punishment enforcement). One should 
note more generally that this strategy is also observed in other groups. In the 
aggregate, punishment is applied in 37% of unfair contracts, in 18% of other 
contracts with q=0.5. In that group, agents do not seem to bother about 
reciprocation. There is no contract rejection despite the number of unfair 
contracts; agent Y1 free rides (and he continues to do so even after a 
punishment) on the high productivity of agent Y2 who, in turn, tries not to get a 
reduced payoff by choosing on the average a level of effort greater than Y1’s one. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Much experimental evidence has established, on the one hand, the 
importance of incentive to free-ride in groups and, on the other hand, the extent 
of fairness and reciprocity in one principal – one agent relationships. 
Distinctively, this paper considers a principal – multi-agent relationship and 
tries to determine whether principal’s fairness helps in limiting the extent of 
free-riding within a team. 
Two repeated game experiments have been run that help to study how 
team cooperation and free-riding develop in principal – multi-agent sequential 
move games. Experimental evidence shows that vertical fairness favors 
horizontal fairness between agents and thus efficiency in the stranger 
treatment. However, a repeated interaction between same subjects need not 
improve team cooperation. 
One should first note that the results of our partner treatment are close 
to the evidence displayed by public goods experiments on individual behavior 
within groups. In such experiments, the level of individual contributions to the 
funding of a public goods declines over time to the free-riding equilibrium, 
mainly due to the coexistence of free-riders and conditional cooperators. 
However, when a punishment device is introduced in such experiments, 
individual contributions raise over time and converge progressively to the 
greatest possible level of contribution (Fehr and Gächter, 1999). Distinctively, in 
our experiment, the punishment mechanism does not succeed in raising team 
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cooperation, because of its asymmetric nature. There is no explicit horizontal 
punishment mechanism enabling a mutual monitoring within the team and the 
vertical mechanism that should favor team cooperation is not efficient in a 
repeated interaction because of its asymmetry: When the threat is credible, the 
more productive agent has an interest in free-riding in order to trigger the 
punishment and, thus, to increase his payoff. 
One should also note that less cooperation is observed here than in a one 
principal – one agent framework because of the incentives to free-ride in a team 
production process. One of our main results is that a fruitful and long-lasting 
cooperation between principal and team-mates is all the more difficult to 
achieve with people differently motivated by fairness. Team cooperation occurs 
in our experiment if and only if two conditions are met. First, team cooperation 
requires that the principal offers a fair contract and does not apply the 
punishment that could trigger the more productive agent’s free-riding. Second, 
team cooperation implies that the more productive agent should accept the 
equal sharing TPS in spite of his higher contribution to the outcome. In such a 
way, cooperation is more demanding since fairness must develop between 
agents and not only between one principal and one agent. In such an asymmetric 
principal – multi-agent relationship, the lack of cooperation in repeated 
interactions is due to the fact that selfish considerations easily dominate 
fairness. 
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APPENDIX 
 
SHARING RULE : TPS-1  
 
A1- 25.0=q  
 
Table 1 – Player Y1’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 126 144 162 180 198 216 234 252 270 288 306 324 
4 132 150 168 186 204 222 240 258 276 294 312 330 
6 136 154 172 190 208 226 244 262 280 298 316 334 
8 138 156 174 192 210 228 246 264 282 300 318 336 
10 138 156 174 192 210 228 246 264 282 300 318 336 
12 136 154 172 190 208 226 244 262 280 298 316 334 
14 132 150 168 186 204 222 240 258 276 294 312 330 
16 126 144 162 180 198 216 234 252 270 288 306 324 
18 118 136 154 172 190 208 226 244 262 280 298 316 
20 108 126 144 162 180 198 216 234 252 270 288 306 
22 96 114 132 150 168 186 204 222 240 258 276 294 
24 82 100 118 136 154 172 190 208 226 244 262 280 
Table 2 – Player Y2’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 126 141 154 165 174 181 186 189 190 189 186 181 
4 135 150 163 174 183 190 195 198 199 198 195 190 
6 144 159 172 183 192 199 204 207 208 207 204 199 
8 153 168 181 192 201 208 213 216 217 216 213 208 
10 162 177 190 201 210 217 222 225 226 225 222 217 
12 171 186 199 210 219 226 231 234 235 234 231 226 
14 180 195 208 219 228 235 240 243 244 243 240 235 
16 189 204 217 228 237 244 249 252 253 252 249 244 
18 198 213 226 237 246 253 258 261 262 261 258 253 
20 207 222 235 246 255 262 267 270 271 270 267 262 
22 216 231 244 255 264 271 276 279 280 279 276 271 
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24 225 240 253 264 273 280 285 288 289 288 285 280 
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Table 3 - Player X’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 118 130 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 
4 124 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 
6 130 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 
8 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 
10 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 
12 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 
14 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 286 
16 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 292 
18 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 286 298 
20 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 292 304 
22 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 286 298 310 
24 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 292 304 316 
 
A2- 5.0=q  
Table 4 - Player Y1’s payoffs 
 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 201 213 225 237 249 
4 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 228 240 252 
6 121 133 145 157 169 181 193 205 217 229 241 253 
8 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 228 240 252 
10 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 201 213 225 237 249 
12 112 124 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 
14 105 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 201 213 225 237 
16 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 228 
18 85 97 109 121 133 145 157 169 181 193 205 217 
20 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 
22 57 69 81 93 105 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 
24 40 52 64 76 88 100 112 124 136 148 160 172 
 
 - 28 - 
 
Table 5 - Player Y2’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 117 126 133 138 141 142 141 138 133 126 117 106 
4 123 132 139 144 147 148 147 144 139 132 123 112 
6 129 138 145 150 153 154 153 150 145 138 129 118 
8 135 144 151 156 159 160 159 156 151 144 135 124 
10 141 150 157 162 165 166 165 162 157 150 141 130 
12 147 156 163 168 171 172 171 168 163 156 147 136 
14 153 162 169 174 177 178 177 174 169 162 153 142 
16 159 168 175 180 183 184 183 180 175 168 159 148 
18 165 174 181 186 189 190 189 186 181 174 165 154 
20 171 180 187 192 195 196 195 192 187 180 171 160 
22 177 186 193 198 201 202 201 198 193 186 177 166 
24 183 192 199 204 207 208 207 204 199 192 183 172 
 
Table 6 - Player X’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 136 160 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 
4 148 172 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 
6 160 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 
8 172 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 
10 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 
12 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 
14 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 472 
16 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 484 
18 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 472 496 
20 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 484 508 
22 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 472 496 520 
24 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 484 508 532 
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SHARING RULE : TPS-2 
 
A3- 25.0=q  
Table 7- Player Y1’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 105 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 201 213 225 237 
4 108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 228 240 
6 109 121 133 145 157 169 181 193 205 217 229 241 
8 108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 228 240 
10 105 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 201 213 225 237 
12 100 112 124 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 
14 93 105 117 129 141 153 165 177 189 201 213 225 
16 84 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 
18 73 85 97 109 121 133 145 157 169 181 193 205 
20 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 
22 45 57 69 81 93 105 117 129 141 153 165 177 
24 28 40 52 64 76 88 100 112 124 136 148 160 
Table 8 – Player Y2’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 111 132 151 168 183 196 207 216 223 228 231 232 
4 123 144 163 180 195 208 219 228 235 240 243 244 
6 135 156 175 192 207 220 231 240 247 252 255 256 
8 147 168 187 204 219 232 243 252 259 264 267 268 
10 159 180 199 216 231 244 255 264 271 276 279 280 
12 171 192 211 228 243 256 267 276 283 288 291 292 
14 183 204 223 240 255 268 279 288 295 300 303 304 
16 195 216 235 252 267 280 291 300 307 312 315 316 
18 207 228 247 264 279 292 303 312 319 324 327 328 
20 219 240 259 276 291 304 315 324 331 336 339 340 
22 231 252 271 288 303 316 327 336 343 348 351 352 
24 243 264 283 300 315 328 339 348 355 360 363 364 
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Table 9 - Player X’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 106 118 130 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 
4 112 124 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 
6 118 130 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 
8 124 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 
10 130 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 
12 136 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 
14 142 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 
16 148 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 
18 154 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 286 
20 160 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 292 
22 166 178 190 202 214 226 238 250 262 274 286 298 
24 172 184 196 208 220 232 244 256 268 280 292 304 
 
A4- 5.0=q  
Table 10 - Player Y1’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 103 111 119 127 135 143 151 159 167 175 183 191 
4 104 112 120 128 136 144 152 160 168 176 184 192 
6 103 111 119 127 135 143 151 159 167 175 183 191 
8 100 108 116 124 132 140 148 156 164 172 180 188 
10 95 103 111 119 127 135 143 151 159 167 175 183 
12 88 96 104 112 120 128 136 144 152 160 168 176 
14 79 87 95 103 111 119 127 135 143 151 159 167 
16 68 76 84 92 100 108 116 124 132 140 148 156 
18 55 63 71 79 87 95 103 111 119 127 135 143 
20 40 48 56 64 72 80 88 96 104 112 120 128 
22 23 31 39 47 55 63 71 79 87 95 103 111 
24 4 12 20 28 36 44 52 60 68 76 84 92 
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Table 11 – Player Y2’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 107 120 131 140 147 152 155 156 155 152 147 140 
4 115 128 139 148 155 160 163 164 163 160 155 148 
6 123 136 147 156 163 168 171 172 171 168 163 156 
8 131 144 155 164 171 176 179 180 179 176 171 164 
10 139 152 163 172 179 184 187 188 187 184 179 172 
12 147 160 171 180 187 192 195 196 195 192 187 180 
14 155 168 179 188 195 200 203 204 203 200 195 188 
16 163 176 187 196 203 208 211 212 211 208 203 196 
18 171 184 195 204 211 216 219 220 219 216 211 204 
20 179 192 203 212 219 224 227 228 227 224 219 212 
22 187 200 211 220 227 232 235 236 235 232 227 220 
24 195 208 219 228 235 240 243 244 243 240 235 228 
 
Table 12 - Player X’s payoffs 
 
Effort           Y2 
Y1 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
2 112 136 160 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 
4 124 148 172 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 
6 136 160 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 
8 148 172 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 
10 160 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 
12 172 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 
14 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 
16 196 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 
18 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 472 
20 220 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 484 
22 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 472 496 
24 244 268 292 316 340 364 388 412 436 460 484 508 
 
